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Ninety-eight percent of the world’s undernourished live in devel-
oping countries.1 Of those, the 500 million smallholder farmers2 in the
developing world who account for 60 percent of global agriculture
1. See U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., THE STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY IN THE WORLD
2012: ECONOMIC GROWTH IS NECESSARY BUT NOT SUFFICIENT TO ACCELERATE REDUCTION
OF HUNGER AND MALNUTRITION 8 (2012), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i30
27e/i3027e.pdf [hereinafter UNFAO, STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY 2012] (stating that the
“vast majority of [the 870 million people], 852 million, live in developing countries.”).
2. The International Fund for Agricultural Development defines “smallholder farms”
as those that operate less than two ha of agricultural land. INT’L FUND FOR AGRIC. DEV.,
CONFERENCE ON NEW DIRECTIONS FOR SMALLHOLDER AGRICULTURE: PROCEEDINGS OF
THE CONFERENCE 1 n.2 (2011).
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“make up the largest share.” 3 The calculations of the Food and Agri-
culture Organization of the United Nations (UNFAO) indicate that
a full half of the world’s hungry come from such communities. Yet,
while the UNFAO’s most recent report speaks glowingly of small-
holder farmers’ ability to participate effectively in poverty reduction,4
it speaks of the agrarian malnutrition crisis only in terms of its pro-
pensity to hamper rural labor productivity and economic growth.5
Hunger and poverty are not the only problems faced by small-
holder farmers. Estimates suggest that since the mid-1990s, over a
quarter of a million Indian farmers (particularly those in the dry, pri-
marily cotton-producing areas of Central and North-Eastern India)6
have committed suicide in “the largest wave of recorded suicides in
human history.” 7 National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) records
from 2012 indicate that at least 13,754 people in the “self-employed
(farming/agriculture)” sector killed themselves that year.8 Though
this number seems small in the context of India’s population size, it
is quite likely that these figures under-report the issue. The NCRB
uses an extremely restricted definition of “farmer” for the purposes
of its count;9 furthermore, it does not include in its figures the num-
ber of attempted rural suicides,10 which exacerbates the statistical
3. Elwyn Grainger-Jones, Global Food Crisis: Smallholder Agriculture Can Be Good
for the Poor and for the Planet, GUARDIAN (June 1, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/global
-development/poverty-matters/2011/jun/01/smallholder-agriculture-farming-good-poor
-planet. Of these smallholder farmers, women actually produce 60–80 percent of the food
in the global south, and are actually responsible for a full half of global food production.
U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., Women and Sustainable Food Security, http:/www.fao.org/sd
/fsdirect/fbdirect/FSP001.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2014) [hereinafter UNFAO, Women and
Sustainable Food Security].
4. UNFAO, STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY 2012, supra note 1, at 28.
5. Id. at 29.
6. See CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, EVERY THIRTY MINUTES:
FARMER SUICIDES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE AGRARIAN CRISIS IN INDIA 1 (2011), available
at http://www.chrgj.org/publications/docs/every30min.pdf [hereinafter EVERY THIRTY
MINUTES] (“Cotton exemplifies India’s general shift towards cash crop cultivation . . . the
majority of suicides are committed by farmers in the cash crop sector.”); P. Sainath, Farm
Suicides: A Twelve Year Saga, HINDU (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.thehindu.com/opinion
/columns/sainath/article94324.ece.
7. EVERY THIRTY MINUTES, supra note 6, at 1.
8. See MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS, NAT’L CRIME RECORDS BUREAU, ACCIDENTAL
DEATHS AND SUICIDES IN INDIA 2012 242 (2013) [hereinafter NCRB 2012 REPORT], available
at http://ncrb.gov.in/CD-ADSI-2012/ADSI2012.pdf.
9. P. Sainath, Debt Burden More on Women: P. Sainath, HINDU (Mar. 1, 2011), http://
www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Chennai/article1498597.ece (“[W]omen farmers . . . are
not considered farmers because the land is not in their name . . . suicide by the elder son
of a family who took over the land of his father, and his debts too, is not counted either, for
the same reason . . . Dalits . . . who commit suicide are not part of the official statistics as
most of them do not have clear titles to the land they farm on.”).
10. BITTER SEEDS (Teddy Bear Films 2011), 00:59:21 (“[T]he actual number of des-
perate farmers who attempt suicide is much higher [than reported]. Most are saved at
rural hospitals.”).
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difficulties involved with determining with any accuracy the true ex-
tent of the crisis.
The smallholder farmers who own or operate India’s cotton farms
face many obstacles. Farmers, especially those in the cash-cropping
sector, often incur debt by pledging their land against private loans
from illegal moneylenders in order to pay not only for their capital
needs, but also for “food for their own families, education or jobs for
their children, marriage expenses, health care, [and] dreams of a more
dignified life for their near and dear ones.”11 Private moneylenders
are a last recourse for those who are unable to obtain credit from of-
ficial sources, because their repayments are called in quickly and at
excessive interest rates.12 The decision of a male farmer to commit
suicide as a result of these myriad pressures is deeply tied up in the
patriarchal nature of rural Indian society.13 Although many complex
structural and personal factors contribute to the decision to commit
suicide, it is perceived in many cases as the only route by which to
escape the cycle of crop failure and endemic debt.14 While some stud-
ies suggest that general socio-economic factors, in addition to drought
and a lack of technical capacity on the part of smallholder farmers,
are the major contributing factors to the suicide crisis,15 most ob-
servers agree that crippling debt is “one of the leading causes of the
suicides.”16 Despite the focus on the suicides themselves, however,
ultimately “suicide . . . [is] about the living,”17 and those who are left
behind when their loved ones commit suicide—the women, children,
and the elderly—find themselves paying a steep price.18
The women who take on the traditional work of men when their
husbands, fathers, or brothers commit suicide have been particularly
adversely affected. First, debt does not disappear when its holder
11. RANJANA PADHI, THOSE WHO DID NOT DIE: IMPACT OF THE AGRARIAN CRISIS ON
WOMEN IN PUNJAB xv (2012).
12. Dowry Systems Fuelling Farmers’ Suicides in Vidarbha, NEWSTRACKINDIA.COM
(May 20, 2012), http://newstrackindia.com/newsdetails/2012/05/20/264--Dowry-system
-fuelling-farmers-suicides-in-Vidarbha-.html (noting that dowry payments often lead to
excessive debt).
13. See PADHI, supra note 11, at xvi.
14. Id. at 16.
15. Colleen Scherer, India Does Not Blame Bt Cotton for Farmer Suicides, AG PROF.
(May 9, 2012), http://www.agprofessional.com/news/India-does -not-blame-Bt-cotton-for
-farmer-suicides-150665905.html.
16. Id.; see also SRIJIT MISHRA, RURAL CREDIT AND SUICIDES IN MAHARASHTRA, INDIA:
A CASE-CONTROL STUDY 6 (2006), available at http://www.igidr.ac.in/money/mfc_08/Rural
%20Credit%20and%20Suicides%20in%20Maharashtra,%20India%20A%20Case-Control
%20Study...Srijit%20Mishra.pdf (“Comparing suicide case with non-suicide controls, aver-
age outstanding debt is higher in the former by more than three and a half times.”).
17. EVERY THIRTY MINUTES, supra note 6, at 4.
18. PADHI, supra note 11, at xvi–xvii.
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commits suicide, and moneylenders continue to harass families for
the repayment of loans.19 Additionally, in cases where the land has
been sold or pledged in order to pay off debt, the main source of many
women’s productivity disappears.20 Aside from these immediate im-
pacts, however, the patriarchal structure of rural Indian society fur-
ther serves to marginalize these living victims of India’s rural suicide
crisis, with systems like dowry drastically affecting their ability to
take control of their own lives.21 Because women are second-class
citizens in rural India,22 it is often hard for them to take on primary
decision-making roles in rural households. This results in greater
social insecurity for women and their families.23
This Note suggests that the particular gendered impacts that
result from India’s farmer suicide crisis can be explained by the nu-
merous capital constraints that are imposed on smallholder farmers,
which undermine their ability to participate effectively and efficiently
in the modern agricultural market.24 Although smallholders produce
many of the developing world’s primary agricultural commodities,
their relative market share remains low at the expense of the growth
of large agricultural conglomerates such as Monsanto, Cargill, and
Archer Daniels Midland,25 especially in the cash-crop sector.26 The cor-
responding increases in the availability of knowledge- and resource-
intensive seed technology, combined with the fact that smallholder
farmers lack access to credit,27 further exacerbates the rural debt-
suicide cycle.
19. Id. at xxii (stating that joint families need to “bear out . . . harassment of arhitya,”
or moneylenders).
20. Id. at 25.
21. India’s Unwanted Girls, BBC NEWS (May 22, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news
/world-south-asia-13264301.
22. PADHI, supra note 11, at 33 (“From ownership to land and access to wage work to
fulfilling household responsibilities, women’s position is continuously being determined
in . . . a society that is deeply segregated with class and caste divisions.”).
23. ALEXANDRA SPIELDOCH, INST. FOR AGRIC. AND TRADE POLICY, A ROW TO HOE: THE
GENDER IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION ON OUR FOOD SYSTEM, AGRICULTURAL MARKETS
AND WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS 16 (2007).
24. See, e.g., EVERY THIRTY MINUTES, supra note 6, at 1; UNFAO, STATE OF FOOD
INSECURITY 2012, supra note 1, at 30; Maggie Ellinger-Locke, Food Sovereignty Is a
Gendered Issue, 18 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 157, 157 (2010).
25. For example, Monsanto saw an earnings increase of 45 percent  and Cargill, 86 per-
cent at the beginning of the 2007 global food crisis. Ellinger-Locke, supra note 24, at 157.
26. BHAGIRATH CHOUDHARY & KADAMBINI GAUR, BT COTTON IN INDIA: A COUNTRY
PROFILE 4–6 (2010), available at http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/biotech_crop
_profiles/bt_cotton_in_india-a_country_profile/download/Bt_Cotton_in_India-A_Country
_Profile.pdf (stating that of the 9.6 million hectares of agricultural land used to grow cot-
ton in India in 2009, 8.4 million hectares were used for Bt-cotton, a genetically modified
strain sourced from Monsanto that is the subject of this Note).
27. See UNFAO, STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY 2012, supra note 1, at 30.
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While academic literature has explored the causes of the Indian
rural suicide crisis ad nauseam, it has largely overlooked the impact
of these suicides on women,28 despite the urgency of the issue. This
Note will demonstrate how the international trade regime interacts
with local laws and customs to disenfranchise rural Indian women,
while at the same time undermining male farmers’ access to finan-
cial resources that would help them to avoid spiraling debt traps. In
this regard, the Indian rural suicide crisis has had a double-barreled
gender impact.
To that end, Part I of this Note will discuss the origins of the cur-
rent system of industrialized agriculture by analyzing the global food
security and food sovereignty movements. It will focus on the relation-
ship between food sovereignty and gender, first with regards to the
philosophical underpinnings of this relationship, and second in the
context of the legal regimes that address it.29 Part II will analyze how
the intellectual property protections associated with the global agri-
business regime interact with the Indian government’s trade liberali-
zation efforts to impact the country’s agricultural sector. Part III will
examine the impact that cultural and legal factors have on the female
survivors of the rural suicide crisis. Part IV will offer proposals for
how local and national actors might alter their approach to agricul-
tural sovereignty in a way that will ensure greater financial and social
security for those women who produce over half of the world’s food.30
I. FOOD SECURITY, FOOD SOVEREIGNTY, AND GENDER
A. Global Food Policy and the Green Revolution
A state of food security is said to exist “when all people at all
times have access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a
healthy and active life.” 31 The World Health Organization’s (WHO)
three-pillared approach to food security helps to ensure not only that
people have enough food, but also the resources to obtain it and the
knowledge of how to take care of their health and nutritional needs.32
However, there is a systematized pattern of food insecurity and a lack
of sovereignty over natural resources in what we now refer to as “the
28. Only a limited number of studies have considered the specific issue of the impact
of the suicide crisis on women; these include PADHI, supra note 11, and RATNA K. BANDILA,
FARMERS’ SUICIDES IN INDIA: IMPACT ON WOMEN (2009).
29. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
art. 14, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981), available at http://
www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm [hereinafter CEDAW].
30. See Grainger-Jones, supra note 3.
31. Food Security, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story028
/en/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
32. The WHO’s tripartite framework is built on the three pillars of food availability,
access to food, and usage of nutritional resources. Id.
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developing world.” 33 Many colonized regions were drawn into the
world economy not as equal participants in the market system, but
rather as producers of raw material goods and importers of manufac-
tured technology.34 As such, state support for traditional agricultural
practices was limited or even absent.35 This early “factory-farming”
approach to primary resource production led, in many cases, to a shift
away from traditional, sustainable food-production practices and to-
wards cash-crop production.36 This in turn concentrated land owner-
ship in the hands of a small number of rural elite,37 further reducing
smallholder access to agricultural resources.38
Additionally, the colonial economic project benefited from a
comparative advantage trading system that undermined the ability
of colonized states to actively undertake productive investment
schemes.39 As a result, “developing countries would enter the global
economy . . . dependent on imported food to satisfy domestic nutri-
tional needs, and plagued with poverty and inequality.” 40 Addition-
ally, post–Second World War decolonization resulted in the formation
of a slew of new states that lacked not only the technological innova-
tions available in the First World, but also suffered under a continua-
tion of comparative advantage-based trade limitations.41 Needless to
say, this history has laid the foundations for the current state of rural
poverty and food scarcity in India and many other developing states.
33. See, e.g., Ellinger-Locke, supra note 24, at 162; Carmen G. Gonzalez, Genetically
Modified Organisms and Justice: The International Environmental Justice Implications
of Biotechnology, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 583, 594 (2007).
34. Gonzalez, supra note 33, at 595–96. Indeed, “colonial science viewed peasant agri-
culture as primitive, unproductive, and backward.” Lakshman Yapa, The Poverty Discourse
and the Poor in Sri Lanka, 23 TRANS. INST. BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 95, 102 (1998).
35. V. Nithiyanandam, Ethnic Politics and Third World Development: Some Lessons
from Sri Lanka’s Experience, 21 THIRD WORLD Q. 283, 286–87 (2000).
36. Gonzalez, supra note 33, at 595–96; Yapa, supra note 34, at 101 (noting that the
Crown Land Encroachment Ordinance of 1840 turned “nearly 90 [percent] of the land in
Sri Lanka to Crown property by law”).
37. Gonzalez, supra note 33, at 596.
38. In Sri Lanka, cash crop planters successfully lobbied the government to import
cheap rice from other regions in order to maximize land use for cash crops; not only did this
force smallholders in those areas out of business, but forced smallholders in rice-growing
regions to produce rice exclusively, rather than other crops. Yapa, supra note 34, at 101.
39. See ANDREA MANESCHI, COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 97 (1998) (“[T]hrough machinery and new inventions the imper-
fect manufacturing industry of the East has been destroyed for the benefit of the European
manufacturing power, and the latter enabled to supply the countries of the torrid zone
with large quantities of fabrics at the cheapest prices.”).
40. Gonzalez, supra note 33, at 596.
41. Comparative advantage-based practices continued to be encouraged well into the
post-colonial era in some circumstances, however. Early post-independence leadership in
Sri Lanka came from the rural elite described in supra note 38, and promoting peasant
agricultural initiatives and encouraging industrialization and import-substitution mea-
sures would have undermined their profit retention. Nithiyanandam, supra note 35, at 289.
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It was only in the aftermath of the Second World War that the
question of food scarcity came to the table in a serious institutional-
ized way; innovations in farm machinery technology, new fertilizers,
and more effective pesticides became available in the developed world,
which resulted in significant yield takeoffs.42 Scientists such as
Norman Borlaug took advantage of these technological changes; by
creating new hybrid varieties of maize, and eventually rice and wheat,
they were able to drastically increase the production of these basic
food crops in what is now known as the Green Revolution.43 Their
methods “more than doubled” global food production,44 which al-
lowed states like Mexico and India (which had been classified as
food-deficient prior to the agricultural developments of the 1960s)
to become self-sufficient grain producers at a time when global fam-
ine had been predicted.45 However, rural malnutrition and hunger
are more closely linked to rural poverty than they are to actual food
scarcity,46 and on the basis of this thesis, the Green Revolution has
not been nearly as successful as its proponents suggest.47
This is because the high-technology, high-input approach to cash-
crop agriculture could only ever be adopted in regions that were favor-
able to it in terms of irrigation and climate. As such, interregional
income distribution was fundamentally altered to the detriment of
“well over three-fourths of the poorer farmers in the . . . developing
world.” 48 Even within the most technology-favorable environments,
those farmers with the most assets reaped significantly more socio-
economic benefits than smallholders in the same region.49 Moreover,
global overproduction effectively pushed small farmers out of the mar-
ket, rendering them destitute.50 At the same time, the usage of high-
input agriculture allowed for the rapid growth and institutionalization
42. GORDON R. CONWAY, THE DOUBLY GREEN REVOLUTION: FOOD FOR ALL IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 46 (1997).
43. Id. at 47–49. Mexican grain yields had been averaging less than 800kg/ha prior to
the establishment of Borlaug’s Office of Special Studies in the late 1950s; by the 1960s,
maize yields were averaging over 1000kh/ha. Id.
44. Gonzalez, supra note 33, at 597.
45. Justin Gillis, Norman Borlaug, Plant Scientist Who Fought Famine, Dies at 95, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 13, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/14/business/energy-environment
/14borlaug.html; see also Donald K. Freebairn, Did the Green Revolution Concentrate
Incomes? A Quantitative Study of Research Reports, 23 WORLD DEV. 265, 267–68 (1995).
46. AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT AND DEPRI-
VATION 1 (1981) (“Starvation is the characteristic of some people not having enough food
to eat. It is not the characteristic of there being not enough to eat.”); Ellinger-Locke, supra
note 24, at 159 (stating that the amount of food produced in 2007 was 150% of current
demand); Gonzalez, supra note 33, at 594.
47. Gonzalez, supra note 33, at 597 (“The Green Revolution exacerbated hunger in the
developing world by aggravating poverty and inequality.”).
48. Freebairn, supra note 45, at 267.
49. Id. at 267–68.
50. Gonzalez, supra note 33, at 597.
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of agribusiness conglomerates,51 and a strong business-oriented ideol-
ogy replaced the humanitarian interests that had caused these tech-
nological developments in the first place. Seed suppliers provided all
the ancillary pesticides, fertilizers, and machinery needed to sup-
port the usage of their high-yield hybrids,52 which in turn drastically
increased the amount of capital farmers needed to do their work.53
Importantly, these developments were not limited solely to food pro-
duction initiatives.54
To the extent that the Green Revolution helped to avert a South
Asian food crisis in the 1960s and 1970s, it was a success; however,
the changes effected on global agriculture have drastically undermined
local power over agricultural resources.55 This is because industrial
agriculture tends to turn people from active participants in their own
livelihoods into mere “consumers” of a “product.” This view implicitly
subjects the rural poor to the global processes of supply and demand.56
Given that agricultural production is subject to the vagaries both of
nature and agricultural futures markets,57 this undermines both ac-
cess to and availability of agricultural resources. In order to more fully
address how the system exploits underserved groups such as small-
holder Indian cotton farmers and their wives and daughters, a frame-
work that also takes into account the power dynamics inherent in the
global agricultural system is required.
B. Food Sovereignty and Gender
The food sovereignty movement provides just such a framework.
By dealing with “the right of people to healthy and culturally appropri-
ate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods,
51. Mohsen Al Attar Ahmed, Monocultures of the Law: Legal Sameness in the Restruc-
turing of Global Agriculture, 11 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 139, 145 (2006).
52. Gonzalez, supra note 33, at 598.
53. See Yapa, supra note 34, at 103–05 (noting that the amount of capital Sri Lankan
farmers needed to run their operations in the 1960s and 1970s drastically increased be-
cause of the need to purchase high-nitrogen fertilizers and new pesticides).
54. Today, Monsanto offers patented hybrid seed varieties for cotton, canola and soy-
bean crops as well. Agricultural Seeds, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/products
/Pages/monsanto-agricultural-seeds.aspx (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
55. Ellinger-Locke, supra note 24, at 176–77 (noting that food security can be had
“under a benevolent dictator . . . [who] can provide you with meals and McDonalds and
a little bag of vitamins to compensate your body for the nutrition that McDonalds will
not provide”).
56. Eric Holt-Giménez, The World Food Crisis: What Is Behind It and What We Can
Do, HUNGER NOTES (Oct. 23, 2008), http://www.worldhunger.org/articles/09/editorials
/holt-gimenez.htm.
57. Id. (noting “back-to-back droughts in major wheat-producing countries in 2005–06”
contributed to the global food crisis of 2008); see also Interview by Amy Goodman with
Frederick Kaufman, Contributing Editor, HARPER’S (July 16, 2010), available at http://www
.democracynow.org/2010/7/16/the_food_bubble_how_wall_street.
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and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems,” 58
the movement enables analysts to directly consider how international
agribusiness conglomerates affect local agricultural production.59
Food sovereignty addresses not only agricultural but also environ-
mental and rural development.60 Its focus on smallholder producers
allows subjects like women’s rights, migration, and especially the na-
ture of traditional farming practice to be included in analyses of agri-
cultural policy.61 Food sovereignty activists argue that the high costs
associated with capital-intensive industrial agriculture can be miti-
gated by a focus on local knowledge, which may include embracing tra-
ditional methods of agricultural production that include seed-saving,
natural fertilizer use, and crop rotation.62 This focus on modes of pro-
duction allows analysts to consider the impact of agricultural liberali-
zation not only on smallholder food producers, but also other members
of the global agricultural community, including those who produce
non-food primary commodities such as cotton, cacao, and coffee.
Women have a unique and distinct role to play in this world of
small-scale agriculture, which has not gone unnoticed by either main-
stream observers or food sovereignty advocates.63 Both of these groups
note that rural women face many more difficulties than men when it
comes to gaining access to resources that enable their successful par-
ticipation in agricultural work.64 Significantly, it has been shown that
development efforts directed at improving the lives of women specifi-
cally “benefit the whole household.” 65 As such, even organizations
that emphasize the importance of high-yield approaches to farming,
such as the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in
Washington, DC, assert that the empowerment of women is integral
to ensuring food security in the developing world.66
58. Declaration of Nyeleni, LA VÍA CAMPESINA (Feb. 27, 2007), http://viacampesina.org
/en/index.php/main-issues-mainmenu-27/food-sovereignty-and-trade-mainmenu-38/262
-declaration-of-nyi.
59. See Ellinger-Locke, supra note 24, at 183.
60. Steve Suppan, Challenges for Food Sovereignty, 32 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 111,
118 (2008).
61. Id. at 111.
62. See Yapa, supra note 34, at 101 (describing the traditional practice of using shift-
ing cultivation plots to maintain soil nutrition); BITTER SEEDS, supra note 10, 00:42:11–
00:42:50 (explaining the use of seed saving techniques in the Maharashtrian cotton belt);
BITTER SEEDS, supra note 10, at 00:43:48–00:44:08 (noting that cow dung was traditionally
used as cotton fertilizer).
63. See UNFAO, Women and Sustainable Food Security, supra note 3.
64. UNFAO, STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY 2012, supra note 1, at 30.
65. INT’L FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INST., WOMEN: STILL THE KEY TO FOOD AND NUTRI-
TION SECURITY 2 (2005), available at http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/pubs/pubs/ib
/ib33.pdf [hereinafter IFPRI, WOMEN: STILL THE KEY].
66. Id.; see CEDAW, supra note 29, at art. 14; Lisa R. Pruitt, Deconstructing CEDAW’s
Article 14: Naming and Explaining Rural Difference, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 347,
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This means that a focus on women’s rights is particularly valu-
able to the food sovereignty movement.67 The emphasis on the power
dynamics of the global agricultural system has particular resonance
with feminists,68 who are (generally speaking) also concerned with
how power dynamics affect the human rights of women. In particular,
three aspects of the current global food system stand out as being det-
rimental to these rights. First, the categorization of “the poor” as a
homogeneous group ignores the possibility of significant variance be-
tween rural men and women with regards to access to entitlements.69
Second, inherent cultural factors in the rural Third World detract from
the ability of women farmers to effectively invest in their own re-
source management.70 Third, agricultural liberalization has actually
changed cultural practices associated with food production in ways
that specifically undermine the role of women in the food system. For
example, women in Meso-America have traditionally been seen as
the “keepers of corn seeds,” but the post-NAFTA elimination of tar-
iffs resulted in U.S. corn dumping in Mexico.71 This undermined the
cultural role of corn, which affected women because of their special
relationship with the cash crop.72 This in turn has led to an increase
in unemployment and insecurity for women as well as their families.73
Though both the food sovereignty and feminist movements have
a vested interest in dealing with the issue of women’s limited access
to rural economic opportunity, ecofeminists such as Vandana Shiva
go the furthest in establishing a link between the scientific nature
of agricultural liberalization and women’s rights. Essentially, Shiva
argues that though “science” is generally described as a value-neutral
knowledge system, its origins as “a specific project of western man”
betray its essentially exploitative nature.74
360 (2011) [hereinafter Pruitt, Deconstructing CEDAW] (noting that Art. 14(1) of CEDAW
“makes certain assumptions about rural women, for example, that they play economic
roles—and not only nurturing ones—in relation to their families”).
67. SPIELDOCH, supra note 23, at 12.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., MARTHA NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPA-
BILITIES APPROACH 60 (2000) (suggesting that the best way to address the problems faced
by women in the rural developing world is to look at their individual levels of well-being).
70. For example, in Burkina Faso, men have greater access to “both household and non-
household labor for their farm plots,” which is to say they are more likely to be able to
delegate tasks and use their land and time efficiently—in many parts of the developing
world, where land ownership is concentrated in the hands of men and transferred between
men, women’s rights to use and gain access to land is limited, if not non-existent. IFPRI,
WOMEN: STILL THE KEY, supra note 65, at 1–2.
71. SPIELDOCH, supra note 23, at 16.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. VANDANA SHIVA, STAYING ALIVE: WOMEN, ECOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT 15, 17
(1989), reprinted in THE POST-DEVELOPMENT READER 161, 162, 164 (Majid Rahnema &
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This approach to the issue of science and gender provides an im-
portant analytical tool. If science is viewed as a socially constructed
category,75 rather than an objective truth, then its results can be
evaluated on the basis of their socio-cultural impact rather than the
“objective good” that they may be able to establish.76 Furthermore,
ecofeminism does not stop at an analysis of power structures. Rather,
it establishes a solution to the problems of global agricultural liber-
alization: it “locates production and consumption within the context
of regeneration . . . [and] creates the possibility of viewing the world
as an active subject, not merely a resource to be manipulated and
appropriated.” 77 Ecofeminism channels the reality of women’s in-
volvement in global agriculture, taking into serious consideration
the role that women play in maintaining a sustainable, regenerative
form of rural life.78 As such, it draws clear links between the issues
of the marginalization of rural women and the exploitation of the
environment. The ability to substantively interrogate this nexus will
be valuable when it comes to the creation and evaluation of “new
policy proposals.” 79
C. Rurality in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women (CEDAW) uniquely and specifically addresses
the circumstances and rights of women.80 Unlike some other interna-
tional human rights instruments, CEDAW “asserts that states [must]
maintain positive obligations,” 81 rather than merely desisting from
discriminatory and sexist practices. More significantly, CEDAW ex-
plicitly calls on states to actively engage in the modification of destruc-
tive public and private norms,82 and even goes so far as to suggest that
member states attempt to end all gender stereotyping.83
Victoria Bawtree eds., 1997) (noting that modern science is a “consciously gendered, pa-
triarchal activity”).
75. Id. at 167.
76. Id.
77. MARIA MIES & VANDANA SHIVA, ECOFEMINISM 33 (1993).
78. IFPRI, WOMEN: STILL THE KEY, supra note 65, at 1–2.
79. Ellinger-Locke, supra note 24, at 189.
80. Lisa L. Pruitt, Migration, Development and the Promise of CEDAW for Global
Women, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 707, 729 (2009) [hereinafter Pruitt, Migration, Development,
and the Promise of CEDAW]; Marta R. Vanegas & Lisa R. Pruitt, CEDAW and Rural
Development: Empowering Women with the Law from the Top Down, Activism from the
Bottom Up, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 263, 272–73 (2012).
81. Kathleen Cornelsen, Note, Doubly Protected and Doubly Discriminated: The
Paradox of Women with Disabilities After Conflict, 19 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 105,
116 (2012).
82. Pruitt, Deconstructing CEDAW, supra note 66, at 349.
83. CEDAW, supra note 29, at art. 5.
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CEDAW is also the first international legal instrument that ac-
knowledges the existence of an “intersection” between gender discrim-
ination and rurality.84 By acknowledging that “geography or place”
is one of the bases for the existence of a specific set of disadvantages,85
CEDAW acknowledges the diversity of women’s experience, and shows
a great degree of flexibility when it comes to addressing women’s
rights and needs.86 Article 14 of CEDAW in particular implicitly rec-
ognizes that the development of rural areas is inherently linked with
the autonomous development of the women that live in them.87 While
some critics argue that the mainstream “rural development discourse”
focuses too exclusively on “growth . . . capital . . . technology [and]
becoming modern,” 88 Article 14(2)(a)’s emphasis that women should
be involved in rural development “at all levels” leaves room for the
kind of local engagement in agricultural decision-making that the
food sovereignty and ecofeminist movements envision.89 If it is true
that women are the “keepers of the earth,” increasing their involve-
ment in the processes of local, participatory development “endow[s]
[them] with the power to reject certain development courses, should
they so choose.” 90
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the women who work in India’s
smallholder cotton sector women would prefer to return to less capital-
intensive, more sustainable, agricultural production systems.91 Indeed,
“dwindling agricultural income, rising input costs, deteriorating soil
quality and depleting water tables are [a] cause of worry” for women
who bear the primary responsibility for ensuring the livelihood of
their families and the future of their children.92 However, the wives
of smallholder farmers often take on all the ancillary household duties,
including taking care of the livestock and the family.93 As such, they
are left with little time to participate in local policy-making,94 even in
84. Pruitt, Deconstructing CEDAW, supra note 66, at 350–51; Cornelsen, supra note
81, at 115.
85. Pruitt, Deconstructing CEDAW, supra note 66, at 351.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 359 (“Thus CEDAW is at least implicitly concerned with all rural populations,
not only with women.”).
88. ARTURO ESCOBAR, ENCOUNTERING DEVELOPMENT: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING
OF THE THIRD WORLD 162 (1995).
89. CEDAW, supra note 29, at art. 14(2)(a).
90. Pruitt, Deconstructing CEDAW, supra note 66, at 365.
91. See, e.g., PADHI, supra note 11, at 34. One woman surveyed by Padhi notes that her
family “spend[s] more than what [they] get . . . [they] spend so much on pumps and elec-
tricity, but the water supply is simply not sufficient. The land will never become what it
was earlier.” Id. Another reports that she is “fighting hard not to sell the land just” for the
sake of her children. Id.
92. PADHI, supra note 11, at 36.
93. Id. at 42, 44.
94. Pruitt, Deconstructing CEDAW, supra note 66, at 366–67.
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those rare situations where they are educated enough to take on these
roles,95 or are permitted to do so in the face of local resistance.96
CEDAW addresses this problem by specifically noting that rural
women are more heavily involved than their urban counterparts in
the “non-monetized sectors of the economy.” 97 By calling on member
states to “take all appropriate measures to ensure the application of
the provisions of [CEDAW] to women in rural areas,” 98 its framers
force them not only to acknowledge but also to deal substantively with
the existence of a means of subsistence that cannot be accurately
gauged using “official statistics relating to GDP and employment.” 99
By calling on member states to address the particularity of the rural
woman’s experience both with regards to how it differs from the tra-
vails of urban women and certainly men, the Convention helps to lay
the foundations for greater support of women’s involvement in local
community decision-making. In turn, this helps to advance those
aspects of the ecofeminist and food sovereignty agendas that speak
to the positive impact that rural women can have on local agricul-
tural development.
II. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
INDIAN AGRICULTURAL POLICY
The technological advances of the Green Revolution were driven
to a great degree by humanitarian interests.100 However, the broad-
based use of seed hybridization technology has resulted in the estab-
lishment of a capitalist system that tends to exacerbate intra-regional
inequalities and disenfranchise the poorest of the poor.101 While aca-
demic approaches to the problems posed by the current system of
global agricultural production envision an entirely new approach to
95. U.N. DEP’T. OF ECON & SOC. AFF., DIV. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN ET AL.,
RURAL WOMEN IN A CHANGING WORLD: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 35 (2008) [herein-
after RURAL WOMEN IN A CHANGING WORLD: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES], available
at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/Women%202000%20-%20Rural%20Women
%20web%20English.pdf.
96. Id. at 36 (noting that “stereotypical attitudes . . . and opposition from family and
community members” often inhibit women from participating fully in local governance).
97. CEDAW, supra note 29, at art. 14(1). In Rwanda, for example, this work may in-
clude “cooking, gathering wood, grinding cereals, fetching water, maintenance work, [and]
educating children.” Pruitt, Deconstructing CEDAW, supra note 66, at 360 n.83.
98. CEDAW, supra note 29, at art. 14(1).
99. Pruitt, Deconstructing CEDAW, supra note 66, at 361 (citing Noreen Burrows,
The 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
32 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 419, 447 (1985)).
100. Gillis, supra note 45 (quoting one of Norman Borlaug’s letters to his wife, in
which he says that he “do[esn’t] know what we can do to help these people, but we’ve got
to do something”).
101. See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text.
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rural development,102 such an idealistic view does not give sufficient
weight to the intractability of the international legal regimes in play.103
This Part will briefly address how the emphasis on plant breeders’
rights in the international intellectual property regime has influenced
India’s domestic agricultural policy, and how that policy in turn has
impacted those women who depend on India’s cotton farming sector
for their livelihoods.
A. International Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and Plant
Breeders’ Rights
The first international instrument which granted strong IPR in
the reproduction, commercialization, and sale of protected plant vari-
eties was the International Convention for the Protection of New
Varieties of Plants (UPOV).104 This treaty grants to breeders the
“sole”105 rights to reproduction, commercialization, and sale of treaty-
protected plant varieties. In order to obtain a breeders’ right, the
variety being submitted for consideration must be “clearly distin-
guishable,” “uniform,” “stable,” and “new.”106 These criteria are not
particularly useful for smallholder farmers, who are likely to value
uniformity and homogeneity far less than they do cost, adaptability,
and ease of growth.107
UPOV originally acknowledged these specific needs by carving
out an exception for the usage of genetically modified plant varieties
that allowed farmers to use the technology for “propagating purposes,
on their own holdings,”108 even during the 20–25 year period man-
dated for the protection of breeders’ rights.109 This provision allowed
102. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
103. See International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Dec. 2,
1961, 1861 U.N.T.S. 281 (entered into force Aug. 10 1968), available at http://www.upov.int
/upovlex/en/conventions/1991/act1991.html [hereinafter UPOV] (generally protecting the
rights of plant breeders); Ahmed, supra note 51, at 157 (stating that UPOV “sanctifies—
and thus attaches importance to—the necessary criteria for monoculture production
systems”); Gregory C. Shaffer, The World Trade Organization Under Challenge: Democracy
and the Law and Politics of the WTO’s Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters, 25
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 13 (2001) (noting that private, non-state actors such as Monsanto
often have a significant voice in international policy-making).
104. See UPOV, supra note 103, arts. 6(1)(a)–(d), 15(2), 19 for provisions relating to
requirements for protections of plant varieties and early protections of farmers’ rights;
Ahmed, supra note 51, at 153–58; Ellinger-Locke, supra note 24, at 170; Lauren Winter,
Note, Cultivating Farmers’ Rights: Reconciling Food Security, Indigenous Agriculture,
and TRIPS, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 223, 232–33 (2010) for further discussion of UPOV’s
impact on indigenous agriculture generally.
105. Ellinger-Locke, supra note 24, at 170.
106. UPOV, supra note 103, arts. 5(1)(i), (iv), and (7).
107. Ahmed, supra note 51, at 156.
108. UPOV, supra note 103, at art. 15(2).
109. Id. at art. 19(1)–(2).
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farmers to minimize their costs at the beginning of every new plant-
ing season by reusing seed that had been saved “on the farm where
it was harvested.”110 Given that the kinds of genetically modified crops
that are protected under UPOV were developed with the intent of
improving yield in some way,111 smallholders would have been able
to gain higher profits by decreasing capital and increasing revenue.
However, in a broad concession to the interests of the agribusiness
conglomerates,112 the 1991 amendment to UPOV renders these ex-
ceptions optional.113
Although UPOV is not a widely adopted treaty,114 its relaxation
of the farmers’ exception provision is indicative of a broader shift in
the international IPR regime towards stronger protection of plant
breeders’ rights. One example of this emphasis on breeders’ rights can
be found in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement),115 which is one of the manda-
tory agreements associated with WTO membership.116 The TRIPS
Agreement calls for the protection of plant genetic resources in the
form of patents, an effective sui generis system, or some combination
of the two.117 Although there has been limited guidance relating to
what might constitute an appropriate sui generis system,118 IPR activ-
ists have called for states to adopt UPOV as a model for plant variety
110. Winter, supra note 104, at 232.
111. E.g., Monsanto’s Bollgard(R) gene allegedly improves yield by increasing crop resis-
tance to the bollworm pest; “semidwarf” wheat hybrids were developed with the specific
intent of increasing yield. See Gillis, supra note 45; Cotton in India, MONSANTO, http://
www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/india-pink-bollworm.aspx (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
112. See Winter, supra note 104, at 232 (“[T]he seed industry tends to dislike farmers’
privilege since it exempts small farmers replanting seeds for their own use from repurchas-
ing a successful plant variety year after year.”) Indeed, UPOV was certainly not the last
legal instrument to give breeders’ rights priority over farmers’ rights; the U.S. Congress
followed UPOV’s suit in 1994 and removed a similar farmer’s exception provision from
the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970. Susan K. Sell, Post-TRIPS Developments: The
Tension between Commercial and Social Agendas in the Context of Intellectual Property,
14 FLA. J. INT’L L. 193, 203 (2002).
113. Winter, supra note 104, at 232.
114. Less than half of all countries are members of UPOV; India is one of these states.
See V. Members of the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants,
Status on Dec. 5, 2012, available at http://www.upov.int/export/sites/upov/members/en/pdf
/pub423.pdf. Notably, India is not one of the countries on this list.
115. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights arts. 27(3),
30, 31, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
116. Frequently Asked Questions about TRIPS in the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/tripfq_e.htm#Who%27s Signed (last visited Jan. 10,
2014) [hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions, WTO] (“The TRIPS Agreement . . . applies
to all WTO members.”).
117. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 115, art. 27(3).
118. Sell, supra note 112, at 203.
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protection.119 Though “TRIPS does not require UPOV protection [and]
UPOV protection is not the only permissible approach to sui generis
protection,”120 because TRIPS obligations “are legally recognized as
the minimum standards of protection and enforcement that must be
afforded,”121 all WTO Member States must implement some kind of
plant genetic resource protection regime that is in compliance with
the TRIPS Agreement’s patenting rules.122
B. India’s Struggle with Plant Breeders’ Protections
Generally speaking, the Indian government has been chary of the
idea of introducing transgenic plant varieties for commercial use.123
However, India is the only country in the world that produces all four
main species of cotton,124 and produces 18 percent of the world’s supply
from over a quarter of its cotton-producing area.125 “Roughly ten mil-
lion farm households”126 or up to “60 million people”127 rely on cotton
cultivation for their livelihoods. These clear socio-economic incentives
to support the country’s domestic cotton sector in whatever way pos-
sible may have been a strong contributing factor to the approval of
three Bt-cotton varieties in 2002.128 However, the government has
been prevented from providing adequate protections for those who
rely on cotton production for their livelihoods by the plant breeders’
protections contained in the international IPR regime.
Because India is a WTO member state, it is required to comply
with the standards set out in the TRIPS Agreement.129 However,
119. Id.
120. Id. at 205.
121. WTO TRIPS Implementation, INT’L INTELL. PROP. ALLIANCE, http://www.iipa.com
/trips.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
122. See, for example, TRIPS Agreement, supra note 115, arts. 30–31, which heightens
the requirements for non-authorized use of a patented product. Article 30 provides that
members may provide “limited” exceptions to exclusive rights that do not “unreasonably
conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent.” Id. at art. 30. Furthermore, rights
holders in patents should be paid “adequate remuneration . . . taking into account the
economic value of the authorization.” Id. at art. 31.
123. See Objection Against Bt Cotton Speculative, Confusing: Pawar, HINDU BUS. LINE
(Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/industry-and-economy/agri-biz
/objection-against-bt-cotton-speculative-confusing-pawar/article4140250.ece (noting that
by 2012, Bt cotton was the only transgenic variety approved for commercial use).
124. O. P. Agarwal, Cotton Economy in India, 2007 WORLD COTTON RES. CONF. (Sept. 11,
2007, 1:45 PM), http://wcrc.confex.com/wcrc/2007/techprogram/P1780.HTM.
125. Id.
126. FRANK EYHORN, ORGANIC FARMING FOR SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES?: THE CASE OF COTTON IN INDIA 7 (2007).
127. Agarwal, supra note 124.
128. Kana Talukder & Jennifer Kuzma, Evaluating Technology Oversight Through
Multiple Frameworks: A Case Study of Genetically Engineered Cotton in India, 35 SCI
& PUB. POL’Y 121, 121 (2008).
129. Frequently Asked Questions, WTO, supra note 116.
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it was only after the U.S. and the E.U. filed complaints with the
WTO’s dispute resolution panel regarding India’s failure to imple-
ment TRIPS-compliant pharmaceutical and agricultural patenting
that India established its sui generis system for the protection of new
plant varieties.130 But India did not use UPOV’s framework when it
developed the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act
of 2001 (PPVFRA). Indeed, the PPVFRA differs significantly from
UPOV in that it emphasizes the rights of farmers “in respect of their
contribution made at any time in conserving, improving, and making
available plant genetic resources for the development of new plant
varieties.”131 The PPVFRA protects farmers’ rights to save, use, ex-
change, and share all farm produce, including seeds that fall under
the auspice of the Act,132 and it provides protections of indigenous
knowledge against unwary monetization.133
The possibility thus exists for rural women to be specifically in-
cluded in the rural development process. Very often, it is the women
in farming communities who are the keepers of the seed; they retain
responsibility for selecting seeds for the next season, and pass on that
knowledge to their daughters.134 To the extent that the PPVFRA main-
tains the “social and economic welfare”135 of the country’s agricul-
tural populations even in the face of compelling and overwhelming
technological advance, it provides a successful sui generis framework
for plant protection that other, similarly situated states can follow.
Despite the relative liberalism of the PPVFRA, however, a more re-
cent piece of legislation seems to uphold breeders’ rights even in the
face of controversy.136
130. Appellate Body Report, India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agri-
cultural Products, WT/DS50/AB/R/ (Dec. 19, 1997).
131. The Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act, No. 53 of 2001, INDIA
CODE (2001), vol. 64, at 1 [hereinafter PPVFRA], available at http://www.plantauthority
.gov.in/pdf/PPV&FRAct2001.pdf. See also Shrividhya Ragavan & Jamie Mayer O’Shields,
Has India Addressed Its Farmers’ Woes? A Story of Plant Protection Issues, 20 GEO. INT’L
ENVTL. L. REV. 97, 113–23 (2007) for more detail on the working parts of the PPVFRA.
132. PPVFRA, supra note 131, at art. 39(1)(iv).
133. See id. at art. 40 (reserving the Registrar’s right to reject applications for regis-
tration of new plant genetic resources if they are satisfied that the applicant has failed
to “disclose . . . information regarding the use of genetic material conserved by any tribal
or rural families in the breeding or development of such a variety”).
134. Kavitha Kuruganti, This Seeds Bill Must Go, INDIA TOGETHER (Aug. 16, 2005),
http://www.indiatogether.org/2005/aug/agr-seedbill.htm.
135. Ragavan & O’Shields, supra note 131, at 101 (noting that an “effective” sui generis
system under TRIPS Article 27 should be read in light of the Agreement’s Article 7 & 8
requirements, which, in balance, allow for “members’ rights and obligations [to] be read
alongside . . . principles[ ] which vest members with the right to prioritize their national
public interests”).
136. See Suman Sahai, The Controversial New Seed Bill, Gene Campaign Press Release
(May 9, 2011), http://www.docstoc.com/docs/79095014/THE-CONTROVERSIAL-NEW
-SEED-BILL.
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The Seeds Bill of 2004 contained three specific provisions that
came under fire from farmers’ rights activists. First, this Bill went
further than the PPVFRA in opening the Indian market to private
and foreign investment.137 Second, the Seeds Bill’s registration re-
quirements do not incorporate the PPVFRA’s high standards for
establishing parentage and origin of new seeds in the process of
commercialization grants,138 leading to a lack of clarity as to which
piece of legislation controls. However, the third provision is the most
egregious; Article 22(1) of the Seeds Bill characterizes the “barter-
ing” of seed as “dealing” of seed, and thus requires even smallholder
farmers who barter seed as a matter of course to obtain registration
certificates as seed dealers from the state government.139 Character-
izing smallholder farmers as dealers leads to a monetization of tradi-
tional agricultural practice in precisely the way that many theorists
deride. Such an approach veers away from the sustainable, thoughtful
practice of traditional agriculture and towards a market-incentivized
bureaucratic method of conducting business that ultimately margin-
alizes the rural poor and creates yet another barrier to entry into the
development process.140
Given that the PPVFRA was not superseded by the Seeds Bill,
there remains a question as to why the Indian government felt com-
pelled to shift away from the former document’s protectionist tone
when it drafted the later legislation. Increased international pressure
to open the country’s market to foreign products and foreign direct
investment undoubtedly had an impact on national decision-making.
There is a possibility that the Seeds Bill was established in 2004 in
order to court a special economic relationship with the U.S. Indeed,
one of the elements of the 2005 trade agreement between India and
the U.S. was the establishment of the Indo-U.S. Knowledge Initiative
in Agricultural Research, Education and Marketing.141 Significantly,
Monsanto retains a permanent representative seat on the Initiative’s
137. Sukanya Pillay, India Sinking: Threats to the Right to Food, Food Security & Devel-
opment in an Era of Economic Growth, 27 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 127, 162 (2009).
138. Kuruganti, supra note 134.
139. The Seeds Bill, No. 52 of 2004, INDIA CODE, art. 22(1) (2004).
140. Ragavan & O’Shields, supra note 131, at 126 (“[A]ggressive privatization can result
in marginalizing those who practice traditional farming.”).
141. Devinder Sharma, ‘Free’ Trade Killing Farmers in India 55, 56, in BIOTHAI & GRAIN,
FIGHTING FTAS: THE GROWING RESISTANCE TO BILATERAL FREE TRADE AND INVESTMENT
AGREEMENTS (2008), available at http://www.bilaterals.org/fightingFTA-en-Low.pdf. The
main objectives of this Initiative are to encourage knowledge-sharing between Indian and
American experts in the fields of food processing, food marketing, biotechnology, and water
management. GOV’T OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF AGRIC., DEP’T OF AGRIC. R. & EDUC, INDO-US
KNOWLEDGE INITIATIVE ON AGRICULTURE: FACT SHEET (2007), available at http://pib.nic
.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=16134.
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governing board,142 which indicates both that Monsanto has some
degree of influence on American policy-making initiatives,143 and now,
on India’s as well. Whether or not the Seeds Bill was drafted in the
hope of establishing some kind of trade relationship with the U.S., it
is nevertheless clear that this relationship has curtailed the ability
of the Indian government to adequately represent and protect the
needs and rights of its smallholder farmers.144
C. Impact of India’s Plant Breeders’ Protections on Women
Women are specifically disenfranchised by market approaches
to agricultural growth and development. While there is certainly a
possibility that “landless women . . . known for their seed selection
and seed keeping skills”145 might have some opportunity to capitalize
on the “dealer” status that the 2004 Seeds Bill might impose, such an
argument is ignorant of the cultural reality in which these women
live. Lack of access to resources in areas known for widespread
corruption (as, unfortunately, vast swathes of India are) could sub-
ject illiterate, landless women who have long thrived on trust-based
community systems to the vagaries of bureaucratic systems that they
know nothing about.146 At the same time, the fact that the Seeds Bill
encourages market liberalization without providing adequate pro-
tection for farmers serves only to exacerbate rural inequality.147
It is clear that the commercialization of agriculture that resulted
from the Green Revolution has found much traction in the interna-
tional IPR regime, and certainly in inter-state trade agreements.
Furthermore, it is evident that those regimes have the ability to influ-
ence national policy in a way that enables international agribusiness
142. GOV’T OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF AGRIC., DEP’T OF AGRIC. R. & EDUC, US-INDIA AGRI-
CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE INITIATIVE: BOARD MEMBERS (2007), available at http://www.fas
.usda.gov/ICD/india_knowl_init/board.asp.
143. Although it is true that international legal regimes and inter-state relationships
are traditionally developed and governed by state representatives, private, non-state actors
often have a significant role to play in international policy-making; this is just one example
of how that role may play out in reality. Shaffer, supra note 103, at 13.
144. One of the most disturbing manifestations of this failure to protect smallholder
needs is that affordable, non-hybrid seed varieties are now almost unavailable on the
market; if farmers want to plant cotton, they are restricted to purchasing expensive Bt-
licensed varieties. BITTER SEEDS, supra note 10, at 00:44:29–00:44:59.
145. Kuruganti, supra note 134.
146. Id.
147. It has been alleged, for example, that the Bollgard II(R) technology that replaced
the original Bt cotton varieties to which bollworms developed resistance were the result
of business strategies specifically designed to “grossly increase high-cost inputs on an
annual basis.” Pillay, supra note 137, at 163; see also Kamaldeep Singh Brar, Bt Cotton:
No Seed of Doubt Left, HINDUSTAN TIMES (Nov. 6, 2012) http://www.hindustantimes.com
/Punjab/Bathinda/Bt-cotton-no-seed-of-doubt-left/SP-Article1-955811.aspx.
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firms to capitalize on and subvert traditional relationships between
farmers and their crops. The disenfranchisement of women from one
of their traditional roles in agricultural production, however, is only
one unintended side-effect of improving transnational corporate access
to domestic crop sectors. The spiraling debt traps that have resulted
from the introduction of Bt varieties into the Indian cotton market are
one of the primary causes of the spate of agricultural suicides, which
in turn create various gendered problems in India’s cotton belt.
III. CULTURE, GENDER, AND SUICIDE
The international IPR regime has internalized the profit-driven
logic of industrial agriculture, thus drastically altering the day-to-
day practices of smallholder farmers the world over. The women who
depend on these farms face limitations on their ability to participate
in their own livelihoods even without the disenfranchisement that
accompanies cash-crop agricultural production. As a result, the in-
creased social vulnerability that arises when a husband or father
commits suicides makes women’s lives even more difficult.148 This
Part will consider how the patriarchal nature of rural Indian society
contributes to the current farmer suicide crisis, specifically through
the lens of the dowry system. It will also discuss some of the tribula-
tions that widows, mothers, daughters, and sisters face when male
farmers commit suicide. This Part will then argue that local and
national policy attempts to alleviate these specific gendered burdens
have failed to adequately do so, first because of the assumptions
made about the nature of women’s labor in the agricultural sector,
and second because they never truly address the underlying cause
of the crisis.
A. Dowry and Debt
Although India officially outlawed dowry in 1961, in reality there
has been little abatement in the practice.149 By and large, dowry en-
tails the payment of a “groom price” paid by the family of the bride.150
Because the marriage of a daughter is considered to be a father’s duty,
the birth of a girl in an Indian agricultural household is often seen
as an unwelcome addition to the family’s debt burden.151 Importantly,
148. See BITTER SEEDS, supra note 10, at 01:23:35–01:23:55 (“The children of fathers
who commit suicide are victimized twice. First they lose their father’s protection, then they
lose their childhood.”).
149. India’s Unwanted Girls, supra note 21.
150. PADHI, supra note 11, at 62.
151. India’s Unwanted Girls, supra note 21; BITTER SEEDS, supra note 10, at 00:53:29
(“Farmers who cannot afford to marry their daughters suffer extreme social shame.”).
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the ability of relatively wealthy farmers to “indulge in lavish wedding
celebrations”152 in the aftermath of the Green Revolution drastically
inflated the value of dowries,153 and it is not uncommon today for po-
tential grooms’ families to demand impossibly high settlements.154
Parents of daughters often go into deep debt in order to assure that
their daughters will be married.155 In instances where such families
have exhausted their access to institutional loans, often because they
are obliged to pay for expensive hybrid seeds and brand-name fertil-
izers, “the poor are left with no other option but to approach private
moneylenders . . . who, taking advantage of their helplessness, tend
to suck them dry.”156 Sometimes, when peasants are obliged to pledge
their land against their debt, the “shock and the shame” associated
with this realization also results in suicide.157
Problematically, dowry-related debt cannot generally be allevi-
ated under the kinds of post-suicide remuneration orders that are
available in some Indian states. For example, the state of Andhra
Pradesh is willing to give up to INR 150,000 (1.5 lakhs) to the families
of rural suicide victims, as long as the suicides “arise[ ] out of farm
income related issues.”158 However, debt incurred because of dowry
is unlikely to be seen as sufficiently related to farming inputs for
debt alleviation compensation to become available. As such, when
a farmer commits suicide because of dowry-related debt, his female
relatives are charged with paying off his loans without the benefit
of state assistance.159 If the farmer in question was obliged to sell his
land in order to put together a dowry, or if he was a landless laborer
in the first place, the surviving women must make payments while
also attempting to lease land, or perform seasonal, low-wage labor
on somebody else’s.160 As a result, when farmers commit suicide over
their debt, whether that debt is caused by the need to pay for daugh-
ters’ dowries or Bt cotton seeds, they are transferring to their female
relatives a “culture of destruction” that is almost impossible to escape
without substantial assistance.161
152. PADHI, supra note 11, at 67.
153. India’s Unwanted Girls, supra note 21.
154. See BITTER SEEDS, supra note 10, at 00:51:57–00:52:53.
155. PADHI, supra note 11, at 64.
156. Id. at 64–65.
157. BITTER SEEDS, supra note 10, at 00:57:59–00:58:56. In the dowry context, this
shame is as likely to be associated with the inability to pay the demanded price (and atten-
dant inability to provide for one’s daughter’s future) as it is with the realization that there
is no more land to work or own. See id. at 00:53:29.
158. GOV’T OF ANDHRA PRADESH, G.O.MS. NO. 421 (2004), available at http://www
.aponline.gov.in/quick%20links/departments/revenue/govt-gos-acts/2004/go.ms.421.2004
.html [hereinafter G.O.MS. NO. 421].
159. PADHI, supra note 11, at 70.
160. Id. at 44–45.
161. Id. at 46.
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B. The Impact of Suicide on Women’s Production
Women are second-class citizens in rural India.162 Although they
may not be directly involved in the “ ‘productive’ ” labor of a small
farm,163 they are nonetheless integral to its functioning. In addition to
“procuring clean water . . . and cultivating home gardens to supple-
ment the family diet,”164 women perform significant amounts of out-
door agricultural work in their family’s fields.165 Despite this, “women
are not seen as farmers—only as farmers’ wives,”166 which undermines
the extent to which they are able to take a central role not only in their
own development, but also in the development of their communities.167
Significantly, because rural Indian women are already societally
relegated to the sphere of “home economics,”168 they tend to take an
active, visible role in the management of their landholdings only when
the (male) head of the house is incapacitated.169 Because they must
juggle “intense agricultural work in addition to housework and caring
of livestock,”170 the women who end up taking on primary decision-
making roles subject themselves to unique pressures that male farm-
ers in rural India need never face. But because they do face these
unique risks and pressures, and because their successful navigation
of these pressures is likely to result in greater community returns,171
rural Indian women are provided with special assistance from state
and local governments.
C. The Inadequacy of State Remuneration
It has been noted already that state and national governments
are willing to try and help alleviate the capital pressures on farmers
and their families. At the state level, governments have offered to
provide economic assistance to the bereaved family members of farm
suicide victims;172 at the national level, the possibility of increasing
162. Id. at 33 (“From ownership to land and access to wage work to fulfilling house-
hold responsibilities, women’s position is continuously being determined in relation to
the patrilocal, patrilineal family, in a society that is deeply segregated with class and
caste divisions.”).
163. Id. at 36.
164. Pruitt, Migration, Development, and the Promise of CEDAW, supra note 80, at 727.
165. PADHI, supra note 11, at 48.
166. Id. at 44.
167. See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.
168. Pruitt, Migration, Development, and the Promise of CEDAW, supra note 80, at 727.
169. PADHI, supra note 11, at 40.
170. Id.
171. IFPRI, WOMEN STILL THE KEY, supra note 65, at 2.
172. G.O.MS. NO. 421, supra note 158.
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agricultural investments and raising minimum crop prices to improve
farmers’ income has been discussed.173 In both instances, the govern-
ment is clearly taking action with the intent of keeping smallholder
households as far away from the debt cycle as possible. However,
because these debt-alleviation strategies do not question the under-
lying logic of high-production agriculture,174 their ability to truly lift
farmers out of poverty is limited.
In order to be truly successful, such strategies—especially those
that involve providing compensation to farmers’ families—need to
take into specific consideration the actual nature of the constraints
imposed upon smallholders. It has already been noted that Andhra
Pradesh’s G.O. 421 does not make funds available for the repayment
of dowry-related debt when there is a strong correlation between
that debt and the “social humiliation eventually leading to suicide.”175
Dowry debts are often excruciatingly high, and the profits upon which
farming families generally rely are swallowed up by debts associ-
ated with farming costs.176 As such, it is easy to imagine how the need
to repay dowry loans might be seen as the straw on the proverbial
camel’s back. However, where a “suicide verification and certifica-
tion” committee’s investigations show that dowry payments consti-
tuted the majority of a farmer’s debt or worries about his debt, then
it is wives and daughters and sons that will be saddled with the cost
of repaying it.
Rules such as G.O. 421 utterly fail to take into consideration the
fact that the person whose name is on a deed is not always the farmer
who works the land, and as a result is not always the farmer who has
taken his or her life.177 This is another realm in which the devalua-
tion of women’s labor in rural India comes into play. Because state
officials who implement G.O. 421 have internalized the traditional,
“insular” view of women’s roles in rural society,178 some of them cate-
gorically deny that women who are obliged to take on the primary role
173. Farmers’ Suicide a Serious Issue, but Numbers Declining: Sharad Pawar, TIMES
OF INDIA (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.im4change.org.previewdns.com/latest-news-updates
/farmers039-suicide-a-serious-issue-but-numbers-declining-sharad-pawar-17499.html
[hereinafter Farmers’ Suicide a Serious Issue].
174. See ESCOBAR, supra note 88, at 162.
175. G.O.MS. NO. 421, supra note 158; see also supra notes 156–58 and accompany-
ing text.
176. PADHI, supra note 11, at 63. The average loan amount to cover wedding and dowry
expenses easily exceeds INR 100,000 and interest rates on non-institutional loans often
exceed 20 percent per annum. Id. at 62–63.
177. Uma Sudhir, Women Farmers Who Commit Suicide Ignored by State, NDTV.COM
(Jan. 8, 2012), http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/women-farmers-who-commit-suicide
-ignored-by-state-164440.
178. Id.
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in a small farming household had even done so in the first place.179
By suggesting that the families of women who commit suicide because
of the pressures associated with farming are not eligible to receive
government aid, those officials who espouse this position ignore en-
tirely the fact that women take on these prominent family roles only
under “dire conditions and tragic circumstances.”180 As a result, even
when officials who are charged with implementing G.O. 421 do so
in an efficient way,181 the “cabining” of Indian women into an exclu-
sively “home economic” role doubly disenfranchises the families of
suicide victims by taking away not only their last means of productive
capacity,182 but also any ability that they may otherwise have to cope
with that loss.
D. Problems with CEDAW-Compliant Women’s
Support Mechanisms
CEDAW clearly has an important role to play in establishing
positive rights for rural women that help them to rise above the
limited role that they are given in traditional patriarchal systems.
Indeed, Article 14 calls for states to ensure that women have greater
access to “self-help groups and co-operatives in order to obtain equal
access to economic opportunities” and “equal access to agricultural
credit and loans [and] marketing facilities.”183 CEDAW enforces these
aspirational clauses by imposing a strong burden for domestic incor-
poration.184 In addition to this incorporation requirement, Article 18(1)
of CEDAW establishes that states must report to the Secretary-
General once every four years after ratification on “the legislative,
judicial, administrative or other measures which they have adopted
to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention.”185 CEDAW’s
strength as a tool for rights enforcement was enhanced by the adop-
tion of the Optional Protocol,186 which includes a procedure by which
179. Id.
180. PADHI, supra note 11, at 40.
181. Implement GO 421, Says HRF, HINDU (June 25, 2012), http://www.thehindu.com
/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-andhrapradesh/article3567744.ece (noting that “only nine
families [out of 54 cases] have got interim financial assistance under GO 421”).
182. Pruitt, Migration, Development, and the Promise of CEDAW, supra note 80, at 727.
183. CEDAW, supra note 29, at arts. 14(2)(e), (g).
184. Pruitt, Migration, Development, and the Promise of CEDAW, supra note 80, at
733 (“States that have ratified or acceded to CEDAW ‘are obliged to undertake all legis-
lative and other appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women with-
out delay.’ ”).
185. CEDAW, supra note 29, at art. 18(1).
186. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women, G. A. Res. 54/4, U/N.DOC.A/54/49 (2000) (entered into force Dec. 22,
2010) [hereinafter CEDAW, Optional Protocol].
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individuals or groups can bring complaints against a state party for
behavior that is not “compatible with the provisions of the Conven-
tion.”187 Though the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women (the Committee) has only issued decisions on ten
complaints since the passage of the Optional Protocol, none of which
pertain to Article 14,188 and though its recommended changes are not
legally binding, the existence of such a rights-based dispute mecha-
nism helps to give CEDAW teeth as an international instrument.
India has taken its CEDAW obligations quite seriously. Eighty-
four percent of India’s rural self-help groups (SHGs) are restricted
to women’s membership, and India has reported that their usage has
enabled “nearly two million poor, rural families to gain access to the
‘formal banking system.’ ”189 In addition, the Rural Women’s Develop-
ment and Empowerment Project has disbursed “nearly [INR] 3,904
million . . . to about 1.1 million SHGs,” of which about 90 percent are
“exclusive women’s groups.”190 Although it is true that as of 2005, only
14.5 percent of the loans disbursed through these microcredit agen-
cies went to women looking to borrow less than INR 200,000, the fact
that such agencies and self-help groups exist at all could, to a limited
degree, help to explain why less women in rural India appear to com-
mit suicide on account of their debt burdens.191
To the extent that this statistical difference can be explained by
such government initiatives, this could be because co-operatives and
SHGs have a clear and significant role to play in rural development
processes.192 So too do women, who have a greater impact on commu-
nity development in rural areas than their male counterparts.193 Why
is it still the case, then, that India’s farmer suicide crisis has seen
such little abatement?
The first part of the problem may be that there is a lack of rural
infrastructure to help SHGs and their female participants to com-
municate with each other beyond the borders of their immediate
187. Id. at art. 2.
188. Pruitt, Migration, Development, and the Promise of CEDAW, supra note 80, at
734 n.2.
189. Id. at 740.
190. Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Combined Second and Third Periodic Reports of States Parties: India, ¶ 78, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/IND/2–3 (Oct. 19, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw
/cedaw/cedaw36/India2-3E.pdf [hereinafter India, Combined Reports].
191. NCRB 2012, REPORT, supra note 8, at 201. Only 1,956 women who were employed
in the farming/agriculture sector were officially reported as suicides, in comparison to
the 12,071 men in that same employment bracket. However, the problems associated
with these official statistics has already been addressed supra notes 8–10 and accom-
panying text.
192. Vanegas & Pruitt, supra note 80, at 275.
193. IFPRI, WOMEN: STILL THE KEY, supra note 65, at 2.
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localities.194 Such infrastructure would promote intra- and even inter-
regional knowledge sharing, which could actually prevent the ecolog-
ical disaster of running out of domestically grown, non-hybridized,
low-capital seeds for crops.195 Indeed, the increasing affordability
and availability of cell phones and cell towers in rural India could be
integral to improving the autonomy and participation of women in
local communities.196 Numerous studies have shown that cell phone
availability can improve women’s lives by increasing access to health-
care, markets, economic independence, and even mitigating domestic
violence.197 Additionally, because these kinds of technologies could
be adopted by SHGs as a whole rather than by specific farming fami-
lies, the risk that economic differences might be exacerbated by tech-
nological adoption is lessened.
Even if the Indian government were able to improve rural
telecommunications infrastructure, however, focusing on improving
women’s access to resources like cell phones and microcredit seems
to run the risk of inadvertently ignoring whether poor male farmers
have similar access to similar resources. It is significant in this regard
that the Mann Deshi Mahila Group, which includes the “largest micro-
finance bank in Maharashtra state,”198 runs its entire program “by
and for women.”199 Although the number of clients that use the re-
sources of the Mann Deshi Bank could indicate only that women are
more likely to use microcredit as a source of loans than men are, it
may still be the case that they do so merely because there are sources
of microcredit available to them. Another reason why the Mann Deshi
Bank has so many clients may be because it provides them with many
ancillary development-related resources, including “financial and
business management training, community radio, and women’s health
and farming workshops.” 200 These are all provided under the auspices
of its subsidiary NGO, the Mann Deshi Foundation.201 These farming
194. Vanegas & Pruitt, supra note 80, at 292–93 (explaining how “technology can play
a critical role in closing the opportunity gap . . . by fostering networking among women
in different communities and . . . facilitating instruction that may otherwise be accessible
only in metropolitan regions”).
195. BITTER SEEDS, supra note 10, at 00:44:40–00:44:59 (“[B]ut [farmers] don’t realize
that the next village has [given up on its traditional seed saving], and the next, and the
next. And before you know it, in one season, an entire area has no local seed of any local
crop left.”).
196. See Nilanjana S. Roy, Mobile Phones Offer Indian Women a Better Life, N.Y.
TIMES (May 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/23/world/asia/23iht-letter23.html.
197. Id.
198. Vanegas & Pruitt, supra note 80, at 314.
199. Who Are We, MANN DESHI MAHILA BANK, http://www.manndeshi.org/index.html
(last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
200. Vanegas & Pruitt, supra note 80, at 314.
201. Id.
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workshops help women to produce high crop yields by offering soil-
testing facilities and composting education, advice on how to run a
cost-efficient dairy, as well as mobile veterinary services where women
are taught how to care for their livestock.202
There is no doubt that women require, and can greatly benefit
from, access to women’s-only microcredit and agricultural training
programs, and as such there is no doubt that their access to such ex-
clusive resources should be maintained. But to the extent that male
smallholder farmers are forced to rely on institutional loans and
moneylenders in order to fund their work, the wives, mothers, daugh-
ters, and sisters of such farmers end up caught in the same debt-
crises as their male relatives. As a result, they run the risk of having
to face the aftermath of a farmer suicide.203 That institutions like the
Mann Deshi Bank can help them in such circumstances ignores the
fact that the suicides should not be occurring in the first place.
Despite the promise of CEDAW and the Indian government’s at-
tempts to be in compliance with it, when women do not have a strong
decision-making voice in their own homes, mere participation in these
potentially useful SHGs may not be enough to ensure that new knowl-
edge and reasonable debt management skills penetrate individual
households. Where women are obliged to take on all the duties of a
household because their husbands or fathers are incapacitated or
dead, they may not even have the time or energy to dedicate towards
taking advantage of the resources that may be available. To that
degree, the lack of availability of non-gender-specific support systems
that male farmers might be able to take advantage of could be con-
tributing to intra-regional knowledge and wealth disparities in large
swathes of rural India. As such, the expansion of resources like those
offered by the Mann Deshi Foundation to entire rural communities
might help to mitigate the suicide crisis.
Because so many of the Indian government’s gendered agricul-
tural initiatives arise out of CEDAW’s Article 18 reporting require-
ments, it is clear that at least some of the positive rights enumerated
in the Convention are on their way towards being realized.204 However,
the fact that India has funded over a million SHGs across rural India
without taking any further care to ensure the survival and efficacy
202. Farming Programs, MANN DESHI FOUND., http://www.manndeshifoundation.org
/farming.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
203. See infra Parts III.B and III.C for what this may entail.
204. See, e.g., Pruitt, Migration, Development, and the Promise of CEDAW, supra note
80, at 743 (national education programs “aimed specifically at rural girls’ primary educa-
tion . . . succeeded in bringing about ninety percent of rural children within one kilometer
of a primary school”).
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of such organizations suggests that they have done so merely because
Article 14(2)(e) of CEDAW indicates that such institutions should be
established. As a result, these SHGs are less able to provide useful
help to those whom they are intended to serve.
Having said that, the possibility for SHGs to facilitate communi-
cation between female farm workers in different parts of the country
poses exciting prospects for the future of Indian smallholder agricul-
ture, and the provision of reliable telecommunications infrastructure
could be one of the keys to a watershed change in the way smallholder
farms conduct their business. Ultimately, however, while the focus
on providing microcredit to women could help widows and mothers
to avoid permanent and endemic debt, perhaps the most productive
way to deal with both the suicide crisis and help the rural women who
suffer because of it is to dissolve that which causes the debt in the
first place.
IV. POSSIBLE MEANS TO ALLEVIATE THE CRISIS
“The true India is to be found not in its few cities, but in its seven
hundred thousand villages. If the villages perish, India will perish
too.” 205 Today, India’s villages are perishing. The commodification of
the land and of women’s bodies has cost the men and women of rural
India a heavy price,206 and they will continue to pay it unless certain
changes are made to the cultural and economic reality in which they
live. This Part will show that with some adjustments to how India im-
plements its rural development policy, the rights and needs of those
who depend on its agricultural sector can be upheld and preserved.
A. Recognition of Women’s Roles in Agricultural Households
Women’s agricultural labor is “invisible,” 207 and their ability to
contribute to decision-making processes goes all but ignored. To the
extent that a woman can be said to confer real value in a traditional
rural Indian household, it is because she may be a useful source for
young men’s families to obtain a “fat dowr[y]” 208 and an extra pair of
hands to perform the “back-breaking domestic labor” that necessarily
attends rural life.209
205. Satish Kumar, Gandhi’s Swadeshi—The Economics of Permanence, http://caravan
.squat.net/ICC-en/Krrs-en/ghandi-econ-en.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
206. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
207. PADHI, supra note 11, at 39.
208. India’s Unwanted Girls, supra note 21.
209. PADHI, supra note 11, at 39.
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Dowry, then—one of the most insidious manifestations of patri-
archal rural culture—exploits poor women and their families in order
to generate large amounts of excess income, often for the benefit of
those families who would be capable of surviving without it. In some
ways, this mimics the process by which the commodification of agri-
culture has destroyed traditional, sustainable farming practices.210
By turning women’s lives and women’s bodies into a mere commodity
to be sold and bought, the dowry system devalues the unique, indi-
vidual contributions that young women might otherwise be able to
make in their communities. Similarly, the homogenization of nature
on which all industrial agriculture is based “leads to [a] destruction
of diversity” and local knowledge that ultimately results in “indebt-
edness, of peoples and nations.” 211
If the dowry system persists even despite the fact that it was il-
legalized a full half-century ago,212 it is because there has not been a
sufficient change in how rural India views its women. This Note thus
proposes that rural women be viewed as providers of sustenance
rather than as producers of profit,213 in order to emphasize the in-
tegral role that they play in rural life. Such a view allows women to
be seen not as subjects or victims of economic and cultural processes
that are outside their control, but rather as active participants in the
sustenance and development of their own communities. Indeed, when
the rights of women are specifically addressed by local and national
state- and non-state initiatives, both men and women benefit. For
example, one aspect of India’s education policy involved increasing
retention of females in primary schools.214 By opening a number of
schools to serve this purpose, the initiative successfully brought 90
percent of rural children (both boys and girls) within half a kilometer
of a primary school,215 and thus access to a free primary education.
Similarly, a view of rural women that takes into account the value
of their agricultural contributions could enhance their decision-making
capacity within households. As a result, women’s participation in
SHGs like the Mann Deshi Foundation would be able to improve farm
efficiency even in those instances where women are not the primary
producers.216 If the Mann Deshi Foundation were to incorporate
210. See VANDANA SHIVA, STAYING ALIVE: WOMEN, ECOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT
45 (1989).
211. Id.
212. India’s Unwanted Girls, supra note 21.
213. See SHIVA, supra note 210, at 42.
214. India, Combined Reports, supra note 190, at ¶¶ 192–96.
215. Pruitt, Migration, Development, and the Promise of CEDAW, supra note 80, at 743.
216. See supra notes 198–202 and accompanying text for more information regarding
the work of the Mann Deshi Group.
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some type of local seed banking or seed saving mechanism into their
already-broad range of available rural management training pro-
grams, that, too, would certainly contribute to an increase in rural
households’ economic security.
Finally, if it is possible for women to be viewed in rural India on
the basis of their own merit and not on their potential value to a man’s
family, perhaps their purchase and sale will finally end. This would
remove one of the major causes of rural debt altogether.217
B. National Approaches to Improving Farmers’ Economic Security
The other main cause of the inescapable rural debt cycle faced by
smallholder farmers is that when smallholders engage in cash-crop
agricultural practices, they find themselves making large capital in-
vestment for relatively low revenue.218 This is because the logic of in-
dustrialized agricultural production favors large-scale farming.219 In
general, the nature of wealth distribution in rural India is such that
only those farmers who already have the most assets can afford to en-
gage in technology-intensive agricultural production.220 As such, those
farmers with few assets in terms of land or actual capital are forced
into debt in order to remain competitive in the global capitalist econ-
omy, and those debt cycles also have adverse impacts on women.221
Because large agribusiness conglomerates like Monsanto tend to deal
specifically with the Indian federal government when it comes to the
issue of setting rural development policy,222 it is the federal govern-
ment that bears the greatest responsibility and the greatest ability
to make systemic adjustments to those elements of the nation’s agri-
cultural production system that have resulted in crisis and farmer
death. Additionally, because women suffer disproportionately when
their male relatives commit suicide,223 there is an argument to be
made that the Indian government could use debt-mitigation initiatives
in its reports to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women.
Specifically, this Note argues that because the purchase and
planting of specially designed hybrid seeds constitutes a large part of
the cost of smallholder farming, knowledge of the PPVFRA’s farmers’
217. PADHI, supra note 11, at 63.
218. Yapa, supra note 34, at 103–05.
219. BITTER SEEDS, supra note 10, at 01:20:12.
220. Freebairn, supra note 45, at 267.
221. See supra Parts III.A and III.B (discussing how rural debt crises affect the lives
of rural Indian women).
222. See supra notes 138–41 and accompanying text.
223. See supra Parts III.A & III.B.
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rights provisions should be more widely spread amongst the agricul-
tural community.224 By allowing farmers to save, use, exchange, and
share even seeds that are otherwise protected under the PPVFRA,225
the Act mitigates at least some of the capital costs associated with the
adoption of genetically modified, high-yield plant varieties. And while
seed producers may argue (as Monsanto recently has) that “restric-
tions on reproduction, use and transfer are essential to protect the
company’s investment in its patented technology,” 226 concerns about
patent exhaustion are not present in the context of the PPVFRA. In
fact, if seed companies fear that their biotechnology will be used by
farmers to turn a profit, the PPVFRA should cause them no concern:
farmers are prohibited in India from re-selling seed varieties protected
under the Act.227 Additionally, seed companies’ concerns about recov-
ering their “research and development investment through multiple
transactions over many years” 228 is perhaps a slightly disingenuous
argument when the discussion of pest-resistant crop strains is in play,
as it is in India.229 To the extent that seed companies express a real
concern about research and development compensation, it may be
possible for the Indian government to compensate holders of plant
breeders’ rights for the anticipated loss of profit that could result from
the protection of farmers’ rights.230 By doing so, the government would
be able to maintain those aspects of the PPVFRA that protect the
rights of farmers to practice affordable, sustainable agriculture, while
also acknowledging the fact that the biotechnological industry also has
high capital costs on which it needs to make returns. This approach
could allow the Indian government to protect its farmers without find-
ing itself in violation of its TRIPS obligations, or alienating any party
(state or non-state) that could otherwise be useful in developing new
trade relationships.231
224. See, e.g., PPVFRA, supra note 131, at art. 39(1)(iv).
225. Id.
226. Brief for Respondents at 4, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., No. 11-796 (S. Ct. filed
Jan. 16, 2013) [hereinafter Brief for Respondents, Bowman v. Monsanto Co.].
227. PPVFRA, supra note 131, at art. 39(1)(iv).
228. Brief for Respondents, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., supra note 226, at 13.
229. M. R. Subramani, Bollgard III May Come to India Only Around 2020, HINDU BUS.
LINE, (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/industry-and-economy/agri-biz
/article2633343.ece?ref=wl_industry-and-economy. Because pests eventually develop re-
sistance to pest-resistant crops, seed companies who invest in pest-resistance research
essentially create for themselves an ongoing, self-perpetuating market even in the absence
of multiple transactions. See Brief for Respondents, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., supra note
226, at 13; see also supra note 145 and accompanying text.
230. Although future studies may be able to show the extent to which these costs can be
anticipated, none were immediately available during the writing of this Note.
231. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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While mitigating initial capital costs for smallholder farmers
could be one way to improve their cash flow, the other way—as has
been suggested by some experts—would be to increase minimum sup-
port prices of crops in order to help supplement farmers’ income.232
Though both of these solutions are likely to increase farmer profits
and decrease farmer debt, they both come at the cost of increasing
government spending. And while ensuring that the amount of rural
debt decreases is incredibly important, it is equally important to
consider the possible efficiency concerns associated with doing so. In
this regard, the only long-term way to correct the rural debt crisis is
to prohibit the use of genetically modified crops altogether, thereby
allowing farmers to rely on tried-and-tested sustainable methods of
agricultural production.
This is not a decision that the Indian government would take
without precedent. Eight E.U. member states have already banned
the cultivation of genetically modified crops,233 and since mid-2012,
both the Maharashtra state government and the Indian Supreme
Court have called into question the worth of continuing genetically
modified crop cultivation.234 Given the ongoing controversy that has
surrounded the usage of Bt cotton,235 it would not be unjustifiable
for the central government to impose a ban. However, given that
Monsanto (which owns and licenses the Bt technology) has an in-
fluential voice in India’s agricultural governance,236 this is unlikely
to occur.
Having said that, the goal of banning genetically modified crops
throughout the entire country may yet be achievable. The Indian
Supreme Court has very few restrictions on legal standing where it
recognizes the existence of a “public interest action, [where] the
proceedings cut across and transcend . . . traditional forms and
232. Farmers’ Suicide A Serious Issue, supra note 173.
233. Jeannie Stokowski-Bisanti, Eight European Countries Ban Genetically Modified
Crops, Poland the Latest, EXAMINER (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.examiner.com/article/eight
-european-countries-ban-genetically-modified-crops-poland-the-latest.
234. Maharashtra Bans Bt Cotton Seeds, TIMES OF INDIA (Aug. 9, 2012, 5:16 PM),
articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-08-09/india/33118430_1_cotton-seeds-bt-cotton
-cotton-growing-states (describing how the Maharashtrian government has banned entirely
the sale and distribution of Bt cotton seeds throughout the state, replacing them with tra-
ditional Indian cotton seeds); Panel Recommends 10-Year Moratorium on Bt Crop Trial,
ECON. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2012, 5:02 AM), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012
-10-19/news/34584274_1_trials-of-gm-crops-aruna-rodrigues-field-trials (explaining that
a Supreme Court-appointed panel “unanimously recommended” a ten-year moratorium on
field trials of all genetically modified food crops until such time as adequate monitoring
mechanisms are put in place).
235. EVERY THIRTY MINUTES, supra note 6, at 1.
236. US-INDIA AGRICULTURE KNOWLEDGE INITIATIVE: BOARD MEMBERS, supra note 141.
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inhibitions.” 237 Indeed, the aforementioned Supreme Court case was
filed by “public spirited individuals possessing requisite expertise.” 238
While the plaintiffs were able to obtain a favorable decision on the
merits of their case, it is less clear whether a person bringing a public
interest suit on behalf of rural farmers against Monsanto would have
a meritorious claim. Nonetheless, recent precedent suggests at the
very least that they would be able to have their case heard on the
merits, which opens the door for public-spirited individuals to take
direct action on behalf of the farmers who resort to suicide as a means
to escape the pressures of the global agricultural system.
C. Intractability of Change in the International IPR Framework
Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the logic of the international
agricultural system and the IPR regime that supports it will be able
to change in order to accommodate the needs of the world’s small-
holder farmers. The rights of plant breeders are paid special attention
in countries that permit genetically modified crop cultivation,239 and
there are few incentives in place for developing countries to stop using
such technology.240
In that sense, the most that we can hope for is that agribusiness
conglomerates like Monsanto will, in their approach to rural develop-
ment, take into serious consideration the humanitarian impulses that
initially drove the development of their rainmaking technology.241 If
they did so, they might be more amenable to the prospect of lending
a helping hand to farmers who rely on the availability of affordable
inputs in order to maintain their livelihoods.
CONCLUSION
Agribusiness conglomerates continue to put expensive hybrid seed
varieties on the market; poor farmers continue to enter swathes of
debt in order to buy them, and continue to commit suicide when they
can no longer maintain their existence in a poverty-debt cycle. In rural
237. John E. Bonine, Standing to Sue: The First Step in Access to Justice (1999), http://
www2.law.mercer.edu/elaw/standingtalk.html (citing Sheela Barse v. Union of India,
(1988) 4 S.C.C. 226, 234 (India)).
238. Aruna Rodrigues & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (2012) 5 S.C.C. 336 (India),
available at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/126946252/.
239. See, e.g., Eric Holt-Gimenéz, Monsanto v. Bowman: The Master’s Law, HUFFING-
TON POST (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-holt-gimenez/monsanto-v
-bowman-the-mas_b_2721776.html.
240. See supra notes 139–45 and accompanying text.
241. Gillis, supra note 45.
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India, the “invisible” 242 women who often run and always support
smallholder farms are consequently the victims of a process of indus-
trial agriculture that not only devalues traditional modes of agricul-
tural production, but also destroys the lives and livelihoods of those
farmers that once depended on them.
This Note has explored how the logic of capitalist agricultural pro-
duction has penetrated all levels of discourse, from the international
intellectual property regime all the way down to the small subsistence
plots that provide so much of the world’s agricultural output.243 It has
discussed how that logic intersects with the patriarchal structure of
rural India, which in turn throws rural women into a state of poverty
and insecurity that can be very difficult to escape.
But it has also shown how a focus on “the connection of women’s
lives, work and knowledge with the creation of wealth” 244 may help
smallholder farmers to rise above the tribulations of their day-to-day
existences. An emphasis on the regenerative and nurturing aspects
of rural life necessarily includes placing women and sustainable
agriculture at the center of the development discourse. Such a focus
shows us how smallholder farmers can exploit the global capitalist
system in which they live and work, and opens the door for the devel-
opment and establishment of a workable, practical alternative to the
current regime.
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